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Team Success and Personnel Allocation under the National Football League Salary Cap 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A pre-Super Bowl article published in the Wall Street Journal labels the personnel 
spending and business model of the Seattle Seahawks, the National Football Conference 
representative to Super Bowl XL, as "extraordinary." Much to the surprise of the author, "they 
plucked their entire defense from the discount bins" and still made it to the Super Bowl (Walker 
2006). Seattle spent far less on its defense in comparison not only to their Super Bowl 
opponents, the Pittsburgh Steelers, but compared to every single other NFL team. They valued 
"underpriced or underappreciated players who were as long on character and potential as they 
were short on intimidating size and athleticism" (Walker 2006). The success of this previously 
underemployed and ineffective method confounded many familiar with the game. The 
consensus among scholars of the game was the old adage that "defense wins championships" but 
Seattle had intentionally bought its defense at the Dollar General. This paper analyzes the heart 
of this issue: can a team really influence its success based on how it allocates its salary to its 
players? Is there a "natural" allocation strategy inherent to the NFL and its teams that yields a 
successful team? In short, does spending more money to upgrade the talent of certain positions 
yield more team success? 
The National Football League (NFL) is an especially interesting market in which to study 
labor economics. The salary cap rule of the NFL-that each team is permitted the same fixed 
amount of money to spend on its player personnel-allows for controlled comparison between 
teams and players. Because team success depends on the combined output of its players, 
knowing on whom to spend these limited dollars is valuable information. Managers and coaches 
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analyze a player's statistics, discuss him with another manager, watch film ofhis past 
perfonnance, and hold special workout sessions to detennine his potential contribution to the 
team's success. If a player is deemed beneficial and is available to the team, he will be offered a 
contract. This contract awards a fixed salary and may include one or more of several types of 
bonuses-signing, perfonnance-based, option, etc. Most bonuses are amortized across the 
length of the contract and added to the salary to obtain a player's "cap value." Cap value refers 
to the amount a player is paid that counts against the salary cap during a given season. I consider 
this figure to be the dollar equivalent of the player's expected output and contribution to team 
success in each individual season. 
A major aspect of a team manager's duties is to figure how much his team should spend 
on types of players in order to build the best combination ofplayers most conducive to success. I 
posit that there are one or more types ofplayers that are more conducive to a team's success; I 
explain "type" and "success" in Section III. For example, some teams choose to spend more on 
their defensive backs, some on skill position players, some on kickers, etc. Frequently teams 
will build around a core of three to five players whom the front office deem exceptional. By 
looking at the amounts a team spends on types of players, I analyze how these types contribute to 
team success. Specifically, I search for a pattern among recent NFL teams that would indicate 
the marginal effect of additional dollars allocated to a specific type ofplayer. 
I employ economic theory in evaluating the allocation of skilled human capital in the 
NFL. Because the NFL is a multi-billion dollar industry and winning greatly improves a team's 
overall brand and profitability, this study provides insight to those interested in the game and 
also to team managers and owners. Though undoubtedly teams have conducted similar studies 
in an attempt to find a pattern and potentially increase wins, I have found no economic literature 
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that has researched this topic in the manner in which this paper is conducted. The next sections 
include a survey of related literature and my theoretical structure, the IsoWin model. The 
explanation of the data set and the empirical model follow that, trailed by the results of, 
conclusion to, and further avenues for research generated by the model. 
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Lewis (2003) provides an excellent framework for this study, approaching the idea that 
the more a team spends on its players the more success it will have. While he analyzes a 
different market in that of Major League Baseball (MLB), his maxim-that spending fewer 
dollars and allocating them wisely can be more advantageous to a team's success-may also 
apply to the NFL. He studies the Oakland Athletics, which, as oflate, have enjoyed a great deal 
of success in the form of regular-season wins and playoff appearances. The Athletics' payroll is 
substantially smaller than the payrolls ofmost of its competitors due to the small revenue stream 
in Oakland and the ownership's strict obedience to their objective of spending less money. 
Oakland provides a refreshing contrast to the New York Yankees, another perennially successful 
team that spends roughly four to five times more on player personnel than Oakland. The clear 
reason Oakland is as successful: they wisely allocate their payroll. In other words, they are 
getting more for their money. 
NFL teams spend nearly the same amount as each other on their player personnel, so any 
parallel between Lewis's work and the NFL must be changed to fit this difference. In MLB, if a 
team can spend less and still consistently compete with the teams that spend three to four times 
as much as do they, it must be due to their increased efficiency in the allocation of their money. 
Efficient allocation of resources yields success in the same way as a large payroll; solid 
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performance in either category brings success in MLB. However in the NFL, teams are bound to 
operate within the salary cap. Their ability to succeed as a team-namely their ability to win 
more games than the others-can only be achieved through efficient allocation. In spite of these 
differences, Lewis's concept remains the same: it is not necessarily how much money a team 
spends but on whom it is spent that can yield more wins. 
Einolf (2004) writes an excellent survey of the inherent differences between a relatively 
free market like MLB and a strictly regulated market like the NFL. Because MLB teams are 
allowed to limitlessly spend on player personnel, issues such as market size, the owner's 
financial capacity, and fan attendance have a very strong impact on payroll size and team success 
in that league. Larger markets bring higher revenue potential to the ownership, allowing for 
more liberal and extensive spending on player personnel. In the NFL, under its convention of 
profit sharing and its strict salary cap, the aforementioned issues do not have as large an impact. 
Most NFL teams spend roughly the same amount on their players and share revenues to 
compensate for varying attendance figures. As a result, teams in the NFL cannot compete like 
the powerhouse baseball teams such as Yankees. Einolf presents a compelling case for the use 
of a salary cap and establishes that the financial capability of the team does not have a large 
effect on the success of an NFL franchise. Because each team can afford the same caliber of 
players, the differences between teams lie in the management of its salary cap and the 
combination of personnel. 
Karl Einolf (2004) analyzes these two markets-MLB and the NFL-citing the different 
financial structure in each of these leagues. He finds significant difference in the level of 
franchise efficiency-characterized by profit and revenue-between the two leagues. The NFL 
operates under a revenue sharing system which distributes the ticket sales revenues among all of 
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the teams in the NFL, causing small market teams to have revenue comparable to their large­
market counterparts. This allows more teams to hire for the top players, bringing more 
competition into the entire market. Since revenue is the major determinant of a team's payroll, 
teams invariably carry a payroll comparable to their competitors. As a result, "MLB franchises, 
with little revenue sharing and no salary cap, tend to be less efficient than NFL franchises" 
(2004, p. 128). 
On a more individual level, Hendricks et al. (2003) analyze the impact ofuncertainty on 
the hiring process in the NFL, generating hypotheses about the relationship between hiring 
patterns and productivity. There are various estimates of individual success used by the 
managers, but the authors suggest that statistical discrimination-determining a player's 
potential output by his previous statistics-influences choice in this market. Teams sign talent 
based on perceived potential value to the team, which is primarily based on a player's statistical 
past. Players who perform the best are paid the most; the more a player is paid, the more 
conducive to team success he should be. Spending an extra million dollars on a specific position 
leads to an upgrade in personnel; a player's ability is represented by his contract size. 
Leeds et al. (2001) show that free agency and the salary cap brought profound changes to 
the level and nature ofplayers' salaries in the NFL. They analyze data for specific positions to 
demonstrate how free agency and the salary cap increased competition among the labor supply of 
players within each position. Essentially, they confirm that players who perform better receive 
higher salaries. Leeds et al. demonstrate that players are mainly competitive with other players 
in their position; they are concerned with how much their immediate peers are making, not 
necessarily how much is being paid to their teammates. This further indicates that players, 
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because they are evaluated and compensated based on position-specific statistics, are in fierce 
competition with each other. 
This selection of research yields three main ideas. First, each team's success is dictated 
by its management, not necessarily by the size of its payroll. Spending more money relative to 
other teams under the salary cap will not necessarily yield more wins. Second, the efficiency of 
the NFL and its labor market has caused a more competitive labor supply and has increased the 
leverage that management possesses over the players. Because spending is controlled, teams 
have a tighter grasp on the player pool in determining contract length and amount. Third, better 
players get paid more; players receive their salaries based on statistics measuring past 
performance. Spending extra on a certain position should increase the quality of that input. 
Simply increasing the size of one player's contract will not increase talent, but upgrading 
through higher pay should increase the overall contribution of that position to team success. 
These ideas indicate a high level ofmanagerial control and highlight the vitality of finding the 
right combination ofplayers. 
III. THEORETICAL STRUCTURE 
The human capital theory states that laborers will receive a wage that corresponds to their 
projected output. This projected output is based on past performance and potential for success. 
Theoretically, teams should be spending the most on the players that help them the most. I 
analyze which types ofplayers yield the most success. Because the variety ofpositions in 
football contribute differently to a team's ability to win, I group the specific positions into 
categories or "types." This analysis flows directly from the defined nature of each position as it 
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relates to the team's ability to win. The positional duties and the definition of other player 
"types" are outlined in Table 1. 
Table 1 - Player Types as Spending Inputs 
Offense 
Lineman 
Quarterback 
Runningback 
Tight End 
Wide Receiver 
Defense 
Comerback 
End 
Linebacker 
Safety 
Tackle 
Special 
Kicker 
Punter 
Other 
Unused 
Top3 
Top5 
Block defensive players from tackling the Quarterback, open gaps 
in the defense through which the Runningback can run 
Manage and control on-field performance of the team, throw ball to 
offensive players, hand off to offensive players 
Run the ball toward the endzone, usually from a handoff 
Perform duties as a Lineman and a Wide Receiver, usually quite 
versaitle, athletic, and big 
Run the ball toward the endzone, usually on the receiving end of a 
pass from the Quarterback 
Prevent the Wide Receivers from catching the ball, pursue and 
tackle the ball carrier on long-range plays 
Break past the Offensive Line and reach the Quarterback or 
Runningback before he passes the line of scrimmage 
Pursue and tackle the ball carrier on short- to mid-range plays 
Last line of defense, also used to cover Wide Receivers and Tight 
Ends out on deep passing plays 
Break up the Offensive Line to disrupt the ability of the 
Quarterback and Runningback to make a successful play 
Kick field goals and extra points; one of the primary scorers on the 
team 
After an unsuccessful offensive stint, punt the ball to put the other 
team as far away from the endzone as possible 
The amount teams do not spend (salary cap minus payroll) 
The three highest-paid players on the team: the superstars 
The five highest-paid players on the team: the stars 
Within each position there are various sub-types and qualities ofplayers. For example, 
there are middle, strong-side; and weak-side linebackers within the Linebacker position. I do not 
differentiate between these types; their jobs are roughly the same and for the purpose of this 
study are considered one group. The starting Linebackers typically are paid more than the 
reserves, but since the reserves playa key role in preparation and special teams (and their style of 
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play is consistent with the other Linebackers), they are considered one group. The same is done 
when grouping the other positions. 
I consider the expenditure in dollars of each team on each type ofplayer (as defined in 
Table 1) to be representative of the skill and ability of that unit of players. Higher spending on a 
type of player should indicate a stronger set of players at that position. There are varying levels 
of skill among players and therefore it is possible to increase team skill in a certain area if 
spending in that area is increased to purchase more valuable and higher-performing players. If 
that stronger group ofplayers helps yield team success, spending a higher amount is beneficial. 
Managerial skill enters the situation when determining who is worth a higher salary; all players 
will tell you that they are worth a huge contract, so it is the manager's prerogative to find who is 
actually a superior player and worth the extra money. 
Another type of player I study is the "superstar," or the player that demands a high salary, 
receives a high degree of public notoriety, and supposedly, produces game-winning play. If 
these superstars actually produce winning plays, a team's spending on the superstar players 
should be rewarded with more success. Each team has a handful ofplayers who are paid much 
more than the rest of their teammates; are they worth the money? 
I measure levels ofteam success in three different ways: by the final number of wins a 
team achieves in the regular season, whether it is eligible for the playoffs, and its yardage both 
attained on offense and yielded on defense. First, the number of wins a team achieves is a fair 
barometer for fan happiness, the quality of the team, and its success against other teams. It is 
typically what many fans, media, and team personnel analyze to gauge a team's capability. 
However, there are several drawbacks to its use as a dependent variable. It does not take into 
account success in the playoffs, which is the ultimate goal of many teams and fans. While only 
Haugen - 10 
the best teams make the playoffs, it does not measure, for instance, the playoff failure of a team 
with 15 of 16 regular-season wins. Econometrically speaking, using wins as a dependent 
variable indicates that a team with 15 regular season wins is much more successful than a team 
with only 11, while the team with 11 wins may end up winning the Super Bowl and the team 
with 15 wins could lose in the first round. 
Wins also do not consider the closeness of games; two teams with 10 wins each may not 
be just as good as each other. One team may have most of its wins in close games with large 
margins in its losses. A different team with 10 wins might have a large winning margin and 
small losing margin. While this last argument may sway one to consider using winning margin 
instead of wins, I choose wins because more people care about wins than winning margin. If 
winning margin were used, it would have a similar drawback: it would not tell you the actual 
success of a team in quantifiable terms. After all, the game is about winning, not coming close! 
The second dependent variable I use is playoff appearance. Many teams consider playoff 
success more important than regular-season success, and I would agree: the playoffs are more 
important to teams and fans and must be considered. However, it is hard to mathematically 
quantify success in the playoffs without arbitrarily assigning numbers to the different playoff 
rounds. To choose the econometrically sound method, I assign a dummy variable to an 
appearance in the playoffs. This is less than ideal because a team that barely makes it into the 
playoffs is considered the same as the Super Bowl champion. However, it is much easier to 
understand than an arbitrary quantification of the playoff rounds. 
The final dependent variable I use is yardage. This is perhaps the most econometrically 
and numerically reliable variable because it is the most accurate representation of a team's 
strengths and weaknesses. Yardage is incremental in a more micro-oriented way than wins; 
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instead of assigning one win randomly to increase a team's "success" by a specific percent, why 
not use yardage to gauge the exact quality of different aspects of a team's success? After all, 
yardage measures exactly how well a team performed on offense and defense. Nonetheless, 
using yardage entails two significant drawbacks. First, teams would much rather win than 
perform well in the yardage category. In other words, it does not necessarily confront the goal of 
a team's manager-to win games-when determining the salary cap allocation. Second, a team 
with a high degree of offensive success might win just as much as a team with a high degree of 
defensive success. Regressing yardage with respect to positional inputs is not necessarily a good 
measure of overall team success but rather a micro-analysis of different nondescript facets of 
success. 
To assist in the explanation of the theory of this paper, I employ a theoretical model that 
is related to the standard isoquant and budget constraint model in microeconomics. Because the 
isoquant model "shows all the possible combinations of inputs that yield the same output," it 
allows for concise analysis of the theory inherent to the salary cap constraint (Pindyck, 2001, 
179). It is best understood in graphical form, and the graph presented in Figure 1 can be related 
to any team in the NFL in any given season. For the sake of this theoretical explanation, assume 
there are two groups ofplayers: "Group X" and "Group Y" 
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The x-axis is the dollar figure that the team spends on its Group X players; the y-axis 
represents the same for Group Y players. The line stretching from the y-axis to the x-axis is the 
Figure '1 - tso !'in Ii odel 
Gm pY 
Group' 
salary cap, naturally considered the budget constraint in this model. Since every position falls 
under either the Group X or Group Y classification, the salary cap constrains all team spending 
on personnel and forces the money to go to one of the groups. Every team in the NFL is allowed 
to spend up to that point without going a dollar over. 
Suppose success in this situation is measured by the number of wins. Each isoquant­
specifically, the downward sloping, convex curves-represents a number of wins that a team can 
attain in a season. The isoquants are convex because the Group X and Y players are imperfect 
substitutes. As the amount spent on Group X increases, the amount spent on Group Y decreases. 
A team entirely composed of either group would fail to win because each group is necessary. 
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Each isoquant that is further from the origin represents one more win than the last. The 
isoquants approach w*, the highest number of wins achievable by that team during that season. 
The points at which the isoquants intersect the salary cap limit are individual spending 
amounts that a team could choose. For example, point B indicates a possible spending level for 
the example team. It corresponds to a small expenditure on Group X and a large expenditure on 
Group Y. Because this is not a very efficient spending system, it intersects the isoquant that 
corresponds to only B wins. NFL teams play 16 games in a season, and 4 wins is not very 
successful. If they spent at point A, however, they will win 4 more games with the same amount 
of spending. This represents exactly how allocating away from Group Y and toward Group X 
will yield an increase in wins. The points where the isoquants intersect the salary cap line (with 
the exception of the tangency point of w*) are inefficient and therefore correspond to fewer wins. 
As the wins increase, the optimal spending point is reached where isoquant w* is tangent to the 
salary cap line. The next isoquant, w*+1 is not pictured as it would be beyond the salary cap 
limit and therefore unattainable for that team. 
However, in this case, starting at point B we see that Group X players are more 
conducive to winning games, due to specific vital skills needed to play their positions. These 
skills relate directly to a team's ability to win. A dollar spent on a wide receiver may be more 
valuable to the team than the same dollar if it were spent on an offensive lineman because the 
wide receiver can directly advance the ball down the field. In Figure 1, this is indicated by the 
slight slant of the line from the origin down toward the x-axis. Spending a slightly higher 
amount on Group X will yield more wins. I hypothesize that spending more on specific types of 
players will directly affect a team's ability to win. 
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A limitation to the IsoWin model is that, unlike in most industries where firms can 
choose to produce at a higher output, firms in the NFL are limited to 16 wins per season. The 
number ofwins constitutes a zero-sum game; that is, there are only a finite number of wins that a 
team can achieve in a season. For every win there must be a loss, and therefore teams can only 
differentiate between each other up to a certain point. Even though 16 wins is nearly impossible 
to achieve--only one team has ever accomplished such a feat-the standard isoquant and budget 
constraint model cannot be universally applied to a zero-sum situation such as this. 
A second limitation of this model is that it assumes that there are still unexploited 
opportunities in the market. Assuming that there is room for improvement and that some teams 
simply use the "correct" or "optimal" method to allocate salary, the tests should show significant 
coefficients. However, no significant coefficients might indicate that the market is, in fact, 
efficient and that teams are not neglecting some universal law of salary cap allocation. Simply 
put, insignificant results may indicate an exploitable and relatively obvious strategy employable 
by team managers. 
IV. DATA 
A. Dependent Variables - Measures o/Team Success 
I use three measures ofteam success: regular season wins, playoff appearances, and 
yardage. I use the number of wins a team achieves in the regular season. Each team plays 16 
games per season; the "Wins" variable is simply the numerical value of wins attained in a season 
for each team. The next dependent variable considers a team's participation in the playoffs. I set 
up a dummy variable that records "0" if a team does not qualify for one of the 12 playoff spots 
per season, with "1" counting a playoff appearance. 
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Finally, yardage most completely measures a team's specific output over the course of a 
season, insofar as it aids in understanding the consistency of a team's output in a given facet of 
production. I use four types of yardage: Offensive Passing, Offensive Rushing, Defensive 
Passing, and Defensive Rushing. Offensive Rushing is the number of yards in a season that a 
team obtains by running the ball on offense. Defensive Passing is the number of yards yielded 
by the defense to the opposing team's offensive passing game. So, the more offensive yards and 
fewer defensive yards, the better a team performs. The yardage data are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2 - Yardage (per NFL season) 
Type of Yards Average Maximum Minimum Std. Deviation 
Offensive Rushing 1,841 2,774 1,062 336 
Offensive Passing 3,305 5,232 1,946 560 
Defensive Rushing 1,837 2,637 970 310 
Defensive Passing 3,312 4,295 2,423 379 
B. Independent Variable - Salary Cap Allocation by Player Type 
I use salary data for each of the 32 NFL teams over the 2000-2004 seasons published by 
USAToday.com. This amounts to 158 individual team seasons due to the expansion in 2002 
from 31 to 32 teams. They list the full salary cap information for each team and for each season 
with every player that received a salary or bonus included. For each player they list data 
detailing position, salary, the amount of signing and other bonuses, the amortization of these 
bonuses across different seasons, the type of these bonuses, and the "cap value" of every player. 
I standardize the dollar amount into 2004 dollars to control for the effects of inflation, also 
scaling the dollar figures to be in millions of dollars. As is evident by looking at the data found 
in Table 3, there is wide variation between teams in what they spend on each group ofplayers. 
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Table 3 - Independent Variables (in Millions of Dollars)* 
StandardPostion Minimum Average Maximum Deviation 
Offense 
Line $5.080 $11.625 $22.094 $3.361 
Quarterback $1.223 $5.503 $16.590 $2.767 
Runningback $0.970 $5.306 $12.619 $2.165 
Tight End $0.734 $2.464 $7.088 $1.050 
Wide Receiver $2.853 $6.790 $15.163 $2.275 
Defense 
Cornerback $1.369 $6.203 $18.798 $2.795 
End $1.189 $6.086 $14.626 $2.618 
Linebacker $2.502 $7.536 $19.175 $3.039 
Safety $1.705 $4.066 $9.902 $1.599 
Tackle $0.634 $5.161 $12.516 $2.199 
Special 
Kicker $0.056 $0.855 $2.383 $0.478 
Punter $0.069 $0.700 $4.115 $0.435 
Other 
Unused $0.055 $12.142 $32.590 $6.388 
Top3 $7.546 $15.707 $29.279 $3.459 
Top5 $10.790 $22.320 $37.467 $4.321 
*Total team expenditure by position or group 
I also measure "superstar" output by taking the figures from two groups for each team: 
the group of the three highest paid players and the group of the five highest paid players. Adding 
together their salaries, the groups "Top3" and TopS" are created. As is apparent, there is again a 
great range involved with these two variables, indicating no clear pattern in the NFL allocation to 
superstars. Because these data suggest that teams are not following a specific pattern in team 
spending, my hypothesis-that there are groups of players on whom spending money proves 
more beneficial-is tested. 
C. Empirical Method 
I employ an OLS regression to test the effect of salary cap allocation to player type on 
team success. I treat the same franchise's different seasons as independent of each other; i.e. the 
data for the 2002 Minnesota Vikings have no impact on that of the 2003 Minnesota Vikings, 
amounting to 158 individual and unique observations. While this may not necessarily be the 
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case-that a team's previous season may impact its current season-for the purposes of this 
study, I consider them independent to simplify the analysis. My independent variables are the 
dollar figures each team spends on the different types ofplayers, specifically designated in this 
regression by position (as outlined in Table 1) and by size of salary (star power). Another 
variable, "Unused", measures the dollar amount that was not spent by the team but could have 
been spent-i.e. seasonal salary cap minus total team payroll. I use regular season wins, playoff 
appearance, and yardage as dependent variables yielding three sets of regressions. I report four 
regressions for each set. 
v. Results 
The regressions, as a whole, provide modest support for the idea first established in the 
MLB market by Lewis (2003) that there are certain types of players on whom spending more 
money is more conducive to team success than spending on other types. The results of the study 
also support the position of Hendricks et al. who point to a high level of managerial control over 
the success of an NFL team. This model does not test the research of Leeds (2001) or Einolf 
(2004), but does rely heavily on the theory each establishes. Overall, however, the results are 
indicative of relative efficiency and balancing of spending. Because most of the positions did 
not have significant or large coefficients, it indicates that teams generally are doing everything 
they should be doing-there is no obvious pattern that indicates disparity among teams strictly 
based on spending philosophy. 
A. Wins 
Starting with all of the positional variables in the first regression, I eliminated the most 
insignificant variables in the subsequent regressions and added "Unused" and the Star Power 
Haugen - 18 
variables. The regression results are shown in Table 4. I report four regressions to represent the 
improvements on the original model ofplayer position versus the dependent variable. By 
eliminating certain variables and adding others, the regression changes enough to allow for a 
different interpretation and analysis. Each time, the adjusted R-square improved; however, the 
values are quite small. This indicates that wins are not explained very well by the player-type I 
Table 4: Positional Spending, Star Power, and Wins 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Wins 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
Constant 4.207 0.046 4.377 0.010 7.135 0.005 9.915 0.000 
Offense 
Line 0.091 0.206 0.093 0.185 0.036 0.653 0.075 0.354 
Quarterback 0.048 0.580 0.044 0.598 -0.011 0.900 0.014 0.889 
Runningback 0.136 0.218 0.136 0.210 0.093 0.403 0.117 0.300 
Tight End 0.400 0.080 0.399 0.076 0.378 0.091 0.372 0.093 
Wide Receiver -0.010 0.929 
Defense 
Comerback -0.025 0.785 
End 0.129 0.174 0.121 0.189 0.080 0.403 0.095 0.336 
Linebacker 0.032 0.692 
Safety 0.021 0.894 
Tackle -0.085 0.443 -0.089 0.414 -0.141 0.216 ~0.131 0.244 
Special 
Kicker 0.012 0.008 1.213 0.015 1.146 0.026 
Punter 0.031 __...;.;;;.,;,,;., 0.024 -1.312 0.018 -1.111 0.046 
Other 
Unused -0.070 0.137 -0.123 0.020 
Top3 0.647 0.046 
TopS -0.593 0.030 
Adjusted R Square 0.058 0.082 0.090 0.108 
define and/or by the method I use. Each "B" value is the coefficient. Looking at the Regression 
1, spending an extra $1 million-assuming there is $1 million to spend-to upgrade the quality 
of the Runningback leads a team to expect 0.136 more wins. With almost the same degree of 
increase, spending that same $1 million on the Defensive Ends leads to 0.129 more wins. 
Applying this to the other regressions, increasing spending by $1 million on a team's 
Tight Ends will create 0.400,0.399,0.378, and 0.372 more wins, respectively, according to each 
of the four regressions. In the first regression this means that a team that has $1 million to spend 
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to upgrade the quality of its Tight Ends can expect to win 0.40 more games as a result. This 
interpretation changes slightly in the other regressions with the addition and omission of certain 
variables. For example, in the third regression, because I control for teams that had various 
amounts unspent under the cap, spending a million on Tight Ends as opposed to Safeties can 
expect to win 0.378 minus 0.021 or 0.357 more games. Spending an extra $1 million on one 
input requires it be taken from another input. 
The results indicate that the Kicker, and to a lesser extent, the Tight End, have a large 
degree of influence on a team's ability to win and that a Punter does not. Tean1s that spent more 
on their Kickers and Tight Ends and less on their Punters won more regular season games from 
2000-2004. In spite of this, the average team spent during those seasons only $854,000 on its 
Kickers. Spending just $1 million more on the Kicker would yield between 1.345 in the first 
regression and up to 1.213 minus a negative 1.312 or 2.525 more wins (if allocated away from 
the Punter in the third regression). 
Regression three yields an important finding: there appears to be little connection 
between how much a team spends and its overall ability to win. The very small and slightly 
significant coefficient for "Unused" indicates that for each $1 million a team does not spend, it 
loses .07 games. Or, more simply, a team has to spend over $14 million under the cap to lose 
one game. This finding is mitigated somewhat in regression four. Its coefficient is -0.123 which 
would indicate that teams would have to spend only $8 million under the cap to lose a game 
because of their shortfall in spending. 
Perhaps the most unexpected and, consequently, interesting finding of this set of 
regressions is that of the effect ofhigh-priced players on wins. Spending an extra million dollars 
on a team's three highest-paid players yields .647 more wins. This is a relatively high coefficient 
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(and high level of statistical significance) and indicates the importance ofhaving three team 
leaders to whom many dollars are devoted. Equally as surprising is the coefficient for the five 
highest-paid players; at -0.593, it indicates that those players who are fourth and fifth in the 
ranking must not be as important as their salary would indicate. 
B. PlayoffAppearance 
Parallel to the use of regular-season wins to measure success, playoff appearance is a 
tangible measure of team success and an issue with which many teams and fans areconcemed. 
Analyzing playoff appearance as a dummy-or 0,1-.variable allows for a simple and 
mathematically sound regression. The results indicate that, once again, the Kicker is the most 
underpaid player on any team (Table 5). Looking at Regression 5, spending an extra $1 million 
to upgrade the quality of a team's kicker leads to an increase of the marginal probability of 
making the playoffs by 0.253. In contrast, spending that same $1 million on the Punter leads to a 
decrease of -0.146 in the marginal probability ofmaking the playoffs. In every regression, 
Table 5: Positional Spending, Star Power, and Playoffs 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Playoff Appearance (dummy variable) 
Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7 Regression 8 
B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
Constant -0.197 0.559 -0.300 0.232 0.215 0.622 0.432 0.347 
Offense 
Line 0.016 0.178 0.015 0.176 0.006 0.648 0.011 0.402 
Quarterback 0.015 0.297 0.013 0.323 0.002 0.892 0.006 0.716 
Runningback 0.038 0.034 0.039 0.026 0.031 0.090 0.035 0.065 
Tight End 0.012 0.740 
Wide Receiver -0.005 0.764 
Defense 
Cornerback 0.475 0.558 -0.016 0.289 -0.010 0.511 
End 0.016 0.013 0.031 0.049 0.033 0.047 
Linebacker 0.437 0.467 -0.017 0.210 -0.015 0.305 
Safety 0.588 
Tackle 0.748 
Special 
Kicker 0.003 0.249 0.003 0.255 0.002 0.235 0.007 
Punter 0.122 -0.153 0.082 -0.164 0.063 -0.140 0.116 
Other 
Unused -0.012 0.152 -0.017 0.068 
Top3 0.077 0.152 
Top5 -0.069 0.128 
Adjusted R Square 0.076 0.097 0.104 0.106 
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higher spending on the Kicker is shown to contribute more than spending on any other type of 
player. The Defensive End and Running Back both prove to be significant and positive in this 
scenario, indicating that they influence an appearance in the playoffs. This is not all too 
surprising when compared with the "Wins" regressions as both positions have positive 
coefficients and relatively low significance-values in the first set of regressions. 
C. Offensive and Defensive Yardage 
The dependent variable set that differs significantly from the other two is Yardage. The 
results are quite insignificant, and indicate that there is a high degree of ambiguity as to how 
exactly a player's salary can be used to measure his output and contribution to team success. 
Yardage is the most precise representation of team success in a facet of the game-e.g. high 
Offensive Passing yardage over the course of a season indicates a very good passing game. 
However, the results show that, while offensively a team's inputs and spending is reasonably 
correlated with its output, defensively, it is relatively impossible to predict yardage based on 
defensive player spending. The results are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Positional Spending and Yardage 
B Sig. B Sig. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Passing Yardage Gained Rushing Yardage Gained 
Offense 
Constant 2609.711 0.000 1532.968 0.000 
Line -5.850 0.652 8.757 0.273 
Quarterback 48.804 0.003 -7.036 0.473 
Runningback 27.591 0.170 14.117 0.253 
Tight End 48.068 0.247 r--~--"'6=7.-"9=81""'" 0.008 
Wide Receiver 33.837 0.083 0.336 0.978 
Adjusted R Squar~___ 0.081 ~c::----:-_-=___:_:_-:_::0-.0-:3-7-_:_:c_-__:_-
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Passing Yardage Allowed Rushing Yardage Allowed 
Defense 
Constant· 3,558.131 0.000 1,744.929 0.000 
Cornerback 7.390 0.517 14.906 0.109 
End -15.662 0.188 0.008 0.999 
Tackle -2.305 0.870 11.441 0.319 
Linebacker 
-10.078 0.332 -14.669 0.084 
Safety -26.655 0.172 12.677 0.424 
Adjusted R Square 
-0.002 0.009 
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These results indicate that, most predictably, spending on a team's Wide Receivers and 
Quarterbacks correlates positively to a team's passing yardage. Spending an extra $1 million on 
each yields 48 and 33 more passing yards per season, respectively. So, reallocating $5 million to 
$10 million to the passing game is most efficiently spent on those two positions and can be 
expected to lead to up to 480 more passing yards in a season. A team's spending on Tight End­
presumably as a blocking force to clear a path for the Running Backs-increases its running 
game significantly. Spending an extra $1 million on the Tight Ends increases the running game 
by 67 yards per season per million. 
The only significant variable on the defensive side is the positive effect (negative 
yardage) the Linebackers have on the defensive rushing game. Because yardage is not desirable 
on the defensive side, the Linebackers prevent 14 yards per million per season. The generally 
weak results on the defensive side are due to the fact that there are many defensive spending 
. strategies that are either all successful or equally unsuccessful when considering all the teams in 
the league. Because there is no clear pattern in defensive spending that leads to higher defensive 
output in terms of yardage, teams such as the Seattle Seahawks have enjoyed much success with 
their "bargain bin" defense as teams that spend most of their free money on defense paying for 
top-notch players. 
These results indicate that my assessment ofteam spending based on Yardage is weak 
and that the yardage data are not explained well by salary cap inputs. Instead ofpointing to a 
problem surrounding the efficiency of the NFL-that spending on Running Backs is not 
immediately the most significant aspect of a high number of rushing yards in a season-it is 
more sensible to see that teams already are spending efficiently. There is no clear pattern of 
unintelligent teams versus intelligent teams when considering the regressions based on yardage. 
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D. Summary 
Surprisingly the players whom many believe to be integral and on whom much attention 
is focused-the Quarterback, Wide Receivers, and even Linebackers-did not produce 
significant results. This could be because teams may overspend or pay bargain prices on their 
talent at these positions and that balances itself out. Also to be considered in explaining the 
model is the potential for injury. Players always receive a paycheck, injury or not. If a star 
player receives a $10 million cap value and then gets injured, my model does not test for that. 
Injuries are common among the Quarterbacks, Wide Receivers, and Linebackers and other more 
physical positions. What is most likely the case, however, is that teams are already spending 
what they should be spending and that there is efficiency in the market. If teams win just as 
much as they lose and that fact does not depend on spending on these major positions, then it is 
reasonable to conclude that they are already spending what they should be spending. However, 
the Kicker, Punter, and to a large extent the Tight End are positions that do not experience as 
many injuries and are considered sort of necessary nuisances by some teams. In other words, 
they may not have experienced scrutiny in spending patterns, and therefore, teams essentially 
have not determined the efficient means of compensation for these positions. 
VI. Conclusion 
This study supports the hypothesis that there are types of players that are beneficial to a 
team's ability to win and types of players who do not contribute as much. Lewis's Moneyball 
(2003) is aligned with this study. It also finds that there is no one "recipe for success" in the 
NFL and each team could combine any number of different ways and can still succeed. The 
study indicates that there is a high constraint placed on managerial latitude by the salary cap and 
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it is up to the manager of the team to allocate the owner's money wisely. This position is taken 
by Hendricks (2003) and Leeds (2001) and is supported by this study. 
Avenues for further work should include a more comprehensive analysis of the timing of 
signing bonuses and other types ofbonuses. Because teams can choose to offer many different 
types ofbonuses, this may influence the size of a team's salary cap in a given year. This is to 
say that a team can pay a player $10 million in one year, only attributing $1 million to salary and 
$9 million to a performance-bonus. If the player signs a contract for two years, he will make $10 
million against the cap in the first year and only $1 million in the second year. This averages out 
to $5.5 million per season, but does not count in the salary cap as such. As such, teams may not 
be "starting from scratch" each year because team expenditure for each season depends largely 
on the expenditure during other seasons. 
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